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THE ADMINISTRATION’S MEDICAID WAIVERS: EXPLODING IN 
THE GUISE OF EXPERIMENTING 
JANE PERKINS* 
ABSTRACT 
Congress enacted the Medicaid Act with the stated purpose of furnishing 
medical assistance to low-income people. Medicaid participation is not required 
of a state, but if a state does choose to participate—which they all do—the 
federal government will contribute the lion’s share of the cost of providing care. 
In return, the state agrees to pay the remaining costs of care. The state must also 
adhere to the detailed regulatory scheme Congress placed in the Medicaid Act, 
including requirements for determining eligibility for the program and the scope 
and affordability of coverage. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to allow 
states to waive (or ignore) certain requirements to undertake time-limited, 
experimental projects that are likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid 
Act.  
Unlike previous administrations, President Trump is using Section 1115 to 
implement restrictive policies, including mandatory work requirements, that will 
result in dramatic coverage losses. Such policies will, in the President’s words, 
“explode” the Affordable Care Act and its Medicaid expansion. This article will 
provide an overview of the nature and scope of the Section 1115 experimental 
waiver authority and describe how administrations have exercised that authority 
over time. The final sections of this article discuss cases filed by Medicaid 
beneficiaries to challenge the current administration’s actions and explore two 
table-setting legal questions these cases raise: (1) does the Secretary have 
plenary, unreviewable authority to decide whether to approve a Section 1115 




* J.D., M.P.H.; University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law, 1981, University of 
California-Berkeley School of Public Health, 1982. Legal Director, National Health Law Program. 
Disclaimer: Ms. Perkins is counsel for plaintiffs in the cases she discusses in this article. In her role 
as Legal Director of the National Health Law Program, she advocates for plaintiffs in a series of 
lawsuits challenging the Trump administration’s approval of Section 1115 waivers that allow states 
to impose work requirements as a condition of Medicaid eligibility. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Medicaid program to provide medical assistance to 
certain categories of low-income people: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and 
families with dependent children.1 But as the Supreme Court noted in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, as part of the Affordable Care 
Act’s (ACA’s) “comprehensive national plan to provide universal health 
insurance coverage,” Congress “transformed [Medicaid] into a program to meet 
the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 133 
percent of the poverty level.”2 As of June 2019, the Medicaid program provides 
health insurance coverage to more than sixty-five million people in the United 
States.3 
With Medicaid, Congress has offered a “deal for states.” If a state chooses 
to participate in the program—which they all do—the federal government will 
contribute the lion’s share of the cost of providing care. In return, the state agrees 
to pay the remaining portion of the costs of care.4 The state must also adhere to 
the detailed regulatory scheme Congress placed in the Medicaid Act, including 
requirements for determining eligibility for the program and the scope and 
affordability of coverage.5 With respect to determining eligibility, a state cannot 
impose eligibility criteria other than those set forth in the Medicaid Act,6 and it 
cannot pick and choose among individuals within a covered group.7 Each state 
must operate its program through a state Medicaid plan that has been approved 
by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (the 
Secretary of DHHS).8 
The Social Security Act, in which Medicaid is included as Title XIX, does 
include provisions that allow states to ignore some Medicaid requirements.9 
 
 1. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2018). 
 2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV)). 
 3. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., June 2019 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment 
Data Highlights, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/med 
icaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2019). 
 4. Complaint at 3, Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 20, 2019); Julia Paradise et al., Medicaid at 50, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 19–20 (May 6, 2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-medicaid-at-50. 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-5(a) (2018). 
 6. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). See, e.g., Jones v. T.H., 425 U.S. 986, 986 (1976) (affirming a three-
judge district court’s holding that a Utah regulation was inconsistent with Title XIX because it 
added a requirement for obtaining medical assistance); Complaint, supra note 4, at 3. 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B); Complaint, supra note 4, at 3. 
 8. Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, State Plan, MACPAC, https://www.mac 
pac.gov/subtopic/state-plan (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 9. Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: The Current 
Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Feb. 12, 2019), http://files 
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Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary to allow states 
to waive (or ignore) certain requirements to undertake time-limited, 
experimental projects that are likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid 
Act.10  
This article focuses on the nature and scope of this experimental waiver 
authority. It will provide an overview of the statute and its legislative history and 
describe how administrations have exercised the waiver authority over time. 
Unlike previous administrations, President Trump is using these waivers to 
implement restrictive policies, including mandatory work requirements, that will 
result in dramatic coverage losses. Such policies will, in the President’s words, 
“explode” the ACA and its Medicaid expansion.11 The final sections of this 
article discuss cases filed by Medicaid beneficiaries to challenge the 
administration’s actions and explore two table-setting legal questions these cases 
raise: (1) does the Secretary have plenary, unreviewable authority to decide 
whether to approve a Section 1115 waiver and, (2) if not, what level of 
deference, if any, should the courts give the Secretary’s decision?  
II.  OVERVIEW OF SECTION 1115 
A. The Statute and its Primary Requirements 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act states: 
In the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the 
judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of 
subchapter . . . XIX . . . in a State or States— 
(1) the Secretary may waive compliance with any of the requirements of section 
. . . 1396a of this title, . . . to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to 
enable such State or States to carry out such project, and 
(2)(A) costs of such project which would not otherwise be included as 
expenditures under section . . . 1396b of this title, . . . shall, to the extent and for 
the period prescribed by the Secretary be regarded as expenditures under the 
State plan or plans approved under such subchapter . . . .12  
Thus, Section 1115 gives the Secretary of DHHS limited authority. First, the 
Secretary can only approve proposals that seek to undertake an “experimental, 




 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). 
 11. Frank J. Thompson et al., Trump and the Affordable Care Act: Congressional Repeal 
Efforts, Executive Federalism, and Program Durability, 48 PUBLIUS 396, 396, 413–15 (2018). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). This article refers to the provision as it appears in the Social Security 
Act, as Section 1115. 
 13. Id. 
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1115 was intended to allow for “experimental projects designed to test out new 
ideas and ways of dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients. . . . 
Projects . . . are expected to be selectively approved by [DHHS] and to be those 
which are designed to improve the techniques of administering assistance and 
the related rehabilitative services under the assistance titles.”14 Citing this 
history, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that  
[t]he statute was not enacted to enable states to save money or to evade federal 
requirements but to “test out new ideas and ways of dealing with the problems 
of public welfare recipients.” . . . A simple benefit cut, which might save money, 
but has no research or experimental goal, would not satisfy this requirement. 
Rather, the “experimental or demonstration project” language strongly implies 
that the Secretary must make at least some inquiry into the merits of the 
experiment—she must determine that the project is likely to yield useful 
information or demonstrate a novel approach to program administration.15  
Second, the Secretary can only approve projects that are “likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives” of the Medicaid Act.16 The Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396-1, states that Medicaid’s purpose is to 
enable[e] each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to 
furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of . . . individuals, whose income and 
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and 
(2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain 
or retain capability for independence or self-care.17 
While cases have discussed Medicaid’s purpose as furnishing medical assistance 
to people in need,18 this part of Section 1115 has been a central focus of the 
 
 14. S. REP. NO. 87-1589 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1961–62. See also 
H. R. REP. NO. 3982, pt. 2, at 307 (1981) (“States can apply to HHS for a waiver of existing law in 
order to test a unique approach to the delivery and financing of services to Medicaid 
beneficiaries.”). 
 15. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. 
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 664–65 (2003) (plurality) (“The fact that the [Program] . . . provid[es] 
benefits to needy persons and . . . curtail[s] the State’s Medicaid costs . . . would not provide a 
sufficient basis for upholding the program if it severely curtailed Medicaid recipients’ access to 
prescription drugs.”). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). 
 17. Id. § 1396–1. 
 18. Accord Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 571 (1928) (finding Congress established 
Medicaid “for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to 
reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons”). See, e.g., Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of 
Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing § 1396 [now, § 1396-1] as setting 
Medicaid’s “primary purpose”); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 20 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he primary purpose of [M]edicaid is to achieve the praiseworthy social objective of granting 
health care coverage to those who cannot afford it.”); Stewart v. Azar (Stewart I), 313 F. Supp. 3d 
237, 266 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing § 1396-1 as establishing the central objective of the Medicaid Act). 
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litigation challenging the Trump administration’s restrictive waivers. It is 
discussed more fully in Section III, below. 
Third, Section 1115 only authorizes the Secretary to waive a state’s 
compliance with requirements of Section 1396a of the Medicaid Act.19 Section 
1396a describes the mandatory and optional components of the state Medicaid 
plan and, as such, is a pivotal provision.20 That said, the Medicaid Act is a 
complex and lengthy statute that begins with Section 1396 (addressing Medicaid 
and CHIP payment and access commission) and goes through Section 1396w-5 
(addressing health disparities). All told, there are fifty-two provisions outside of 
Section 1396a. Many of them set limits on federal authority, for example, the 
federal government must provide federal funding to participating states (Section 
1396b).21 Others establish protections for program beneficiaries, including 
affordability protections that prohibit states from imposing premiums on very 
low-income people and charging cost-sharing above certain limits (Sections 
1396o and 1396o-1).22 Courts have acknowledged the Section 1396a boundary. 
In Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Thompson, the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, without extensive discussion, 
held, “Although the Act [Section 1115] authorizes the Secretary to waive certain 
Medicaid requirements for such demonstration projects, it does not authorize 
him to waive any requirements of section 1396r–8’s [outpatient drug] rebate 
provision or the [§ 1396o] requirement that Medicaid beneficiaries contribute 
no more than a ‘nominal’ amount to the cost of medical benefits they receive.”23 
Finally, Section 1115 requires the project to be time-limited. The Secretary 
can only grant waivers “to the extent and for the period . . . necessary to enable 
[the] state to carry out” the experiment.24 The costs of such an approved Section 
1115 project are then regarded as Medicaid expenditures under the state 
Medicaid plan.25  
In the ACA, Congress amended Section 1115 to require the Secretary of 
DHHS to implement regulations that ensure a transparent application and 
approval process.26 Among other things, the process must allow for state and 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1). 
 20. Id. § 1396a. 
 21. Id. § 1396b. 
 22. See generally id. §§ 1396o–1396o-1. 
 23. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1). See Cal. Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 
498 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (“As a matter of principle, it is clear that the Secretary would abuse his 
discretion if he were to approve a project which . . . subject[ed] an unreasonably large population 
to the experiment or continu[ed] it for an unreasonably long period.”). 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(2). 
 26. Id. § 1315(d). 
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federal public comment periods prior to the Secretary making a decision on a 
state’s Section 1115 waiver application.27  
B. Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers Over Time 
Over the last fifty years, Section 1115 Medicaid waivers have been used to 
experiment with a wide array of program design features. Early waivers gave 
states the ability to conduct short-term experiments designed to test the use of 
copayments. After two courts upheld these experiments,28 Congress amended 
the Medicaid Act to define the circumstances under which states may impose 
premiums and cost sharing and stated its expectation that further demonstration 
waivers concerning cost sharing would not be necessary.29  
Section 1115 has also been used to experiment with delivery system reform. 
During the 1990s, for example, the Clinton administration approved a number 
of states’ requests to implement Section 1115 waivers to expand Medicaid 
coverage to childless adults who were not at that point described in the Medicaid 
Act. At the same time, these waivers allowed states to contract with managed 
care plans to deliver services to Medicaid beneficiaries.30 Congress subsequently 
amended the Medicaid Act to describe, in detail, the states’ options for using 
managed care for the provision of medical assistance.31 The Obama 
administration approved waivers designed to improve quality of care in 
managed care settings, establish health homes for individuals with chronic 
conditions, and introduce new delivery and payment models for individuals 
eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare.32 Past administrations have also used 
 
 27. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)–(3) (2018). 
 28. See Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 538–40, 543 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also Cal. 
Welfare Rights Org., 348 F. Supp. at 497–98. 
 29. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, H.R. 4961, 97th Cong. § 131(a) 
(1982) (enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1396o to specify states’ options for premiums and cost sharing, 
including the use of waiver authority); H.R. REP. NO. 97-757, pt. 1, at 6 (1982) (“The Committee 
notes that a large number of States have sought waivers of current law relating to the imposition of 
cost-sharing under the demonstration authority at section 1115 of the Act. The Committee believes 
that this bill gives the States sufficient flexibility in this regard to make further exercise of the 
Secretary’s demonstration authority unnecessary.”). 
 30. Laura D. Hermer, On the Expansion of “Welfare” and “Health” Under Medicaid, 9 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 238–40 (2016). 
 31. See generally Balanced Budget Act of 1997, H.R. 2015, 97th Cong. § 4701 (1997) 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396v and enacting § 1396u–2). 
 32. Alexandra Gates et al., An Overview of Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment 
(DSRIP) Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/an-overview-of-
dsrip. 
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Section 1115 waivers to ensure that low-income people can maintain coverage 
during disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina and September 11.33 
In contrast to this history, the Trump administration is using Section 1115 
to fundamentally transform the Medicaid program.34 In 2017, President Trump 
stated his intent to “explode” the ACA, including the Medicaid expansion.35 An 
Executive Order issued just after his inauguration called on federal agencies to 
unravel the ACA.36 Shortly thereafter, DHHS sent a letter to all governors 
stating that the ACA Medicaid expansion “was a clear departure from the core, 
historical mission of the program,” encouraging them to apply for “waiver[s]” 
of coverage requirements—particularly for the expansion population, and 
promising to “fast track” the approvals.37 In a November 2017 speech, the 
Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the 
agency within DHHS directly responsible for implementing the Medicaid Act, 
identified approval of state waivers that condition Medicaid coverage on work 
requirements as part of the Trump administration’s response to the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion.38 In addition, in November 2017, and despite Section 
 
 33. See Medicaid’s Role in Disasters and Public Health Emergencies, MEDICAID & CHIP 
PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, 4 (2018), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ 
Medicaids-Role-in-Disasters-and-Public-Health-Emergencies.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., About Section 1115 Demonstrations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/about-1115/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2019) (establishing Trump administration criteria for Section 1115 applications, 
including potential to “promote upward mobility, greater independence, and improved quality of 
life among individuals” and “[e]nhance alignment between Medicaid policies and commercial 
health insurance products”). 
 35. Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, Affordable Care Act Remains ‘Law of the Land,’ but 
Trump Vows to Explode It, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na 
tional/health-science/affordable-care-act-remains-law-of-the-land-but-trump-vows-to-explode-it 
/2017/03/24/4b7a2530-10c3-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html. 
 36. See Exec. Order No. 13,765, Minimizing the Economic Burden of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act Pending Repeal, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 20, 2017). 
 37. Letter from Thomas E. Price & Seema Verma, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
Governor 1–2 (Mar. 14, 2017) (available at https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-
admin-verma-ltr.pdf). 
 38. See Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Speech: Remarks by 
Administrator Seema Verma at the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) 2017 Fall 
Conference (Nov. 7, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets 
/speech-remarks-administrator-seema-verma-national-association-medicaid-directors-namd-2017-
fall) (stating that the ACA’s decision to “move[] millions of working-age, non-disabled adults into” 
Medicaid “does not make sense” and announcing that CMS would resist that change through 
approving work requirement waivers). See also, e.g., Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs., Remarks on State Healthcare Innovation (Aug. 9, 2018) (transcript available at 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2018-speeches/remarks-on-state-health 
care-innovation.html) (stating that DHHS “is now overseeing the next great generation of 
transformation in Medicaid, through our efforts to encourage work and other forms of community 
engagement”). 
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1115’s focus on time-limited experimental projects, CMS announced that it 
would extend “routine, successful, non-complex” Section 1115 waivers for up 
to ten years.39 
Then, on January 11, 2018, CMS issued a letter to state Medicaid directors 
announcing a “new policy” to “Promote Work and Community Engagement 
Among Medicaid Beneficiaries.”40 The policy established guidelines for states 
wanting to “make participation in work or other community engagement a 
requirement for continued Medicaid eligibility.”41 This action by CMS reversed 
the previous Agency position that work requirements could not be approved 
under Section 1115 because they do not further the objectives of the Medicaid 
Act.42 
A day later, the administration approved Kentucky HEALTH, a Section 
1115 project that, among other things, conditioned medical assistance on 
compliance with work requirements.43 To date, the administration has approved 
work requirements in ten states (AZ, AR, IN, KY, ME, MI, NH, OH, UT, WI), 
and additional requests are pending.44 Notably, the administration has not waited 
to learn the results of these demonstrations but rather included work 
requirements in the Medicaid program, nationwide, in its 2020 budget, with 
projected savings of $130 billion over ten years.45 
 
 39. BRIAN NEAL, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SECTION 1115 
DEMONSTRATION PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS (2017). 
 40. See Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid 
Directors 1 (Jan. 11, 2018) (available at https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/down 
loads/smd18002.pdf). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., to Thomas Betlach, Dir., Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. 2–3 (Sept. 30, 2016) 
(available at https://www.azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/1115Waiver/LetterToState093020 
16.pdf) (stating that work requirements “do not support the objectives of the [Medicaid] program” 
and “could undermine access to care”); Secretary Burwell’s Hearing on “The President’s Fiscal 
Year 2017 Budget:” Before the Energy & Commerce Health Subcomm., 114th Cong. 13 (2016) 
(responses to additional questions for the record by Hon. Joseph R. Pitts). 
 43. MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Re-approval of Kentucky Medicaid Demonstration Waiver, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Re-approval-of-Ken 
tucky-Medicaid-Demonstration-Waiver. 
 44. See State Waivers List, MEDICAID, https://bit.ly/2BYzfms. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: 
Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section 
-1115-waivers-by-state/. Some waivers that were approved have since been set aside by courts in 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire. See id. 
 45. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET IN 
BRIEF, FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2019), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fy-2020-budget-in-
brief.pdf. 
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The administration’s use of Section 1115 to restrict Medicaid coverage is in 
sharp contrast to that of previous administrations.46 Researchers at the George 
Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health reviewed 
Section 1115 approvals across administrations, finding no approved project 
prior to January 2017 that was designed to limit medical assistance. They 
concluded that  
[T]he Trump administration’s … experiments, which are designed to introduce 
benefit rollbacks coupled with multiple eligibility restrictions (the principle ones 
being work as a condition of eligibility, premiums, expanding reporting rules, 
and lengthy lock-out periods for non-compliance) represent a clear departure 
from historical 1115 practice under Republican and Democratic 
administration[s] alike. . . . Looking at approved experiments over the 25 years 
leading up to the Trump administration, it is evident that its use of 1115 has no 
operational precedent.47  
III.  LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE ADMINISTRATION’S WAIVER APPROVALS 
As the Milken Institute report notes, the Trump administration’s approved 
Section 1115 projects include numerous components that reduce coverage (e.g., 
premiums, lock-outs);48 however, it is the work requirements that have received 
particular attention. Ample research finds work requirements to be a dubious 
policy choice. The majority of non-disabled adults who are on Medicaid are 
already working, and the vast majority of those who are not working cannot 
work due to a chronic health condition or caretaking duties.49 According to the 
Kaiser Family Foundation, when those who are working or who cannot work are 
removed from the equation, this leaves only about six percent of the adult 
population at whom work requirements can be directed.50 As a further 
 
 46. Alexander Somodevilla et al., How Far Do Section 1115 Medicaid Experiments Designed 
to Restrict Eligibility and Enrollment Veer from the Norm? A 25-Year Perspective, GEO. WASH. 
U. MILKEN INST. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (June 13, 2019), http://gwhpmmatters.com/blog-how-far-do-
section-1115-medicaid-experiments-designed-restrict-eligibility-and-enrollment-veer. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Rachel Garfield et al., Implications of Work Requirements in Medicaid: What Does the 
Data Say?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2, 5–6 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Impli 
cations-of-Work-Requirements-in-Medicaid-What-Does-the-Data-Say (finding that almost eighty 
percent of adults who are enrolled in Medicaid, but do not receive supplemental security income, 
live in families with at least one worker, and almost sixty percent are working themselves). 
 50. Rachel Garfield et al., Implications of a Medicaid Work Requirement: National Estimates 
of Potential Coverage Losses, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue 
-Brief-Implications-of-a-Medicaid-Work-Requirement-National-Estimates-of-Potential-Coverage 
-Losses. Cf. Rachel Garfield et al., Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid and Work: What 
Does the Data Say?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-
Understanding-the-Intersection-of-Medicaid-and-Work-What-Does-the-Data-Say (placing this 
figure at about seven percent). 
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complication, implementation of work requirements is extremely expensive, 
with cost estimates ranging from $15 to $30 million annually (Michigan)51 to 
$121 million and $163 million in just two years (2020, 2021) for local 
governments (Minnesota).52 A report from Kentucky found that as the state 
began to implement its work requirement waiver, Medicaid administrative costs 
increased more than forty percent, even prior to the work requirements going 
into effect.53 New Hampshire spent $130,000 on outreach alone—prior to 
deciding to delay implementation of its work requirements because so many 
people were facing loss of coverage.54 To further complicate matters, ample 
research establishes that work requirements do not achieve the stated goal of 
moving low-income people into employment with health insurance coverage.55 
Hospitals and community health centers face increased uncompensated care 
costs when individuals lose coverage as a result of a work requirement.56  
Policy arguments aside, the administration’s efforts are legally suspect. The 
administration is relying on Section 1115 to achieve Medicaid transformation 
through the imposition of work requirements.57 As previously noted, however, 
Section 1115 limits waiver projects to those likely to further the Medicaid Act’s 
objectives. In contrast to other public benefit programs such as Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance 
 
 51. Jennifer Wagner & Judith Solomon, States’ Complex Medicaid Waivers Will Create 
Costly Bureaucracy and Harm Eligible Beneficiaries, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL. PRIORITIES 15 
(May 23, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-23-18health2.pdf. 
 52. Id. See also Mattie Quinn, Implementing States’ Medicaid Wishes Won’t be Cheap, 
GOVERNING (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-med 
icaid-work-requirements-states-cost-implement.html. 
 53. Bruce Japsen, Trump’s Medicaid Work Rules Hit States with Costs and Bureaucracy, 
FORBES (July 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2018/07/22/trumps-medicaid-
work-rules-hit-states-with-costs-and-bureaucracy/#36553b3866f5. 
 54. See Holly Ramer, N.H. Delays Work Requirement Compliance Deadline, CONCORD 
MONITOR (July 8, 2019), https://www.concordmonitor.com/New-Hampshire-delays-work-require 
ment-compliance-deadline-26844999. 
 55. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers, et al., Medicaid Work Requirements—Results from the 
First Year in Arkansas, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1073, 1079 (Sept. 12, 2019) (finding “significant 
losses in health insurance coverage in the initial 6 months of the policy but no significant change 
in employment”); Hannah Katch, Medicaid Work Requirements Would Limit Health Care Access 
Without Significantly Boosting Employment, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL. PRIORITIES (Jul. 13, 2016), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/medicaid-work-requirement-would-limit-health-care-access 
-without-significantly. 
 56. See, e.g., Jessica Sharac et al., How Would Medicaid Losses in Approved Section 1115 
Medicaid Work Experiment States Affect Community Health Centers?, GEIGER GIBSON / RCHN 
COMMUNITY HEALTH FOUND. RES. COLLABORATIVE 7 (June 2019), https://www.rchnfoundation. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Draft-GG-IB-59-6.19-FINAL.pdf; Randy Haught et al., How Will 
Medicaid Work Requirements Affect Hospitals’ Finances?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 14, 
2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/mar/how-will-medic 
aid-work-requirements-affect-hospitals-finances. 
 57. Letter from Thomas E. Price & Seema Verma, supra note 37, at 1–3. 
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Program, the Medicaid Act does not authorize work requirements or refer to 
employment or work as a program objective.58 The Federal Agency previously 
took the position that work requirements are not likely to promote Medicaid’s 
objectives because they will reduce, rather than promote, coverage.59 As 
discussed below, Medicaid beneficiaries are bringing court challenges, arguing 
that the administration has exceeded its authority when approving the Section 
1115 waivers and that the approvals are arbitrary and capricious.  
A. Summary of the Cases 
Medicaid beneficiaries in Kentucky, Arkansas, and New Hampshire have 
challenged the Secretary of DHHS’s approvals of Section 1115 Medicaid 
projects in their states. The beneficiaries filed their complaints in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, and in each case, District Court Judge 
James E. Boasberg vacated the Secretary’s approval. The Secretary has appealed 
the Kentucky and Arkansas decisions.60 
1. The Kentucky Case: Stewart v. Azar61 
Approved on January 12, 2018, Kentucky HEALTH was intended to 
“comprehensively transform” the State’s Medicaid program.62 While the project 
targeted the ACA Medicaid expansion population, about twenty percent of 
affected enrollees were caretaker parents and relatives.63 Among other things, 
the approved project authorized Kentucky to impose work requirements (eighty 
hours a month) and impose premiums on very low-income people. Enrollees 
who failed to pay the premiums or meet administrative reporting requirements 
would be terminated from coverage and locked out.64 The approval also 
 
 58. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2018) (declaring purpose of TANF is to 
“end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, 
and marriage”); Id. § 607 (requiring states to ensure that most TANF recipients engage in “work 
activities” and requiring TANF payments to be reduced or terminated if an individual does not 
engage in the work activities.); 7 U.S.C. § 2029(a)(1) (2018) (providing that “[t]he Secretary shall 
permit any political subdivision, in any State . . . to operate a [SNAP] workfare program”). 
 59. Somodevilla et al., supra note 46. 
 60. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 274 (D.D.C. 2018); Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *15 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019). See generally Stewart v. Azar (Stewart 
II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019); Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 185 (D.D.C. 2019), 
appeal docketed, No 19-5094 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 11, 2019). 
 61. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, opin. on re-approval; Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 
(D.D.C. 2019), appeal filed, Nos. 19-5095 & 19-5097. The plaintiffs are represented by the 
National Health Law Program, Kentucky Equal Justice Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, and 
Jenner & Block LLP. 
 62. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (referring to the Commonwealth’s description). 
 63. See Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 268. 
 64. Id. at 246–47. See also Complaint at 22, 23, 37, Stewart v. Hargan, No. 1:18-cv-00152 
(D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018). 
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eliminated both three-month retroactive coverage once a beneficiary enrolls and 
non-emergency medical transportation.65 The Secretary approved the project on 
the grounds that it would promote beneficiary health and wellness, encourage 
their financial independence and transition them to commercial insurance, and 
enhance the fiscal sustainability of the Medicaid program.66 
Medicaid beneficiaries in Kentucky filed suit against the Secretary of DHHS 
and other federal officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
alleging that the approval was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), that the Secretary’s issuance of the January 12, 2018 new 
policy advancing work requirements was an invalid rule under the APA, and that 
the approval was an unconstitutional executive action under the Take Care 
Clause of the Constitution.67 
Before the case could be heard, Kentucky Governor Matthew Bevin tried to 
stop it. He issued an executive order directing the state Medicaid agency to end 
the Medicaid expansion if a court prohibited any part of the Kentucky HEALTH 
project from being implemented.68 He filed a lawsuit in Kentucky against the 
Kentuckians who had filed Stewart v. Azar in the District of Columbia—a case 
that was ultimately dismissed by the Kentucky court.69 He also intervened in 
Stewart v. Azar and, with the Trump administration, unsuccessfully sought to 
have the case transferred from the District of Columbia to his chosen federal 
court in Kentucky.70 Thus, the case proceeded in the District of Columbia.  
Among other things, the plaintiffs claimed the Secretary violated the APA 
because he failed to adequately consider whether the Kentucky HEALTH 
project was likely to assist in promoting Medicaid’s objectives as required by 
Section 1115.71 Judge Boasberg agreed and vacated the Secretary’s approval. 
Following remand, the Secretary re-approved Kentucky HEALTH. There were 
no major changes to the project; rather, as explained below, the Secretary 
 
 65. See, e.g., Letter from Paul Mango, Chief Principal Deputy Adm’r & Chief of Staff, Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., to Carol H. Steckel, Comm’r, Ky. Dep’t of Medicaid Servs. (Nov. 20, 
2018) (available at https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics 
/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/ky-health-ca.pdf). 
 66. Id. at 7–9. 
 67. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (explaining that under the APA, an agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
“entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”). 
 68. Ky. Exec. Order No. 2018-040 (Jan. 12, 2018), http://apps.sos.ky.gov/Executive/Journal 
/execjournalimages/2018-MISC-2018-0040-253682.pdf. 
 69. See Complaint at 1–2, Bevin v. Stewart, No. 03-008, 2018 WL 3973409 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 
19, 2018). For the opinion dismissing the case, see Bevin v. Stewart, No. 03-008, 2018 WL 
3973409, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 2018). 
 70. Stewart v. Azar (Stewart III), 308 F. Supp. 3d 239, 242 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 71. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 136 (D.D.C. 2019). 
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“doubled down” on his original justification. Low-income Kentuckians 
challenged the re-approval on the same grounds raised in Stewart I, and the court 
again found an APA violation.72  
The court’s opinions in the Kentucky cases are quite similar to one another. 
To determine whether the project was likely to promote the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act, Judge Boasberg looked to the Medicaid Act itself—specifically 
42 U.S.C. § 1396-1’s command that states furnish medical assistance as far as 
practicable.73 He then separated the coverage assessment into two sub-issues: 
the risk of coverage losses and the possibility of promoting coverage.74 
Reviewing the Secretary’s approval letters and the administrative records 
underlying the approvals, the court found that the Secretary “never adequately 
considered whether Kentucky HEALTH would in fact help the state furnish 
medical assistance to its citizens, a central objective of Medicaid.”75 In 
particular, the court expressed deep concern that the Secretary entirely failed to 
grapple with Kentucky’s estimate that the project would cause coverage loss 
equivalent to 95,000 people going without Medicaid for a full year.76 The court 
rejected the Secretary’s argument that he had no obligation to estimate coverage 
loss because predictive calculations are murky. As the court pointed out, no 
matter how the number is parsed, “it indisputably reflects that a substantial 
number of people will lose coverage.”77 The court also disagreed with the 
Secretary’s argument that the demonstration would promote coverage because 
it would help transition some individuals to commercial insurance coverage. The 
Secretary had cited no evidence or research to support that statement; nor did 
the Agency explain how those engaging in the community engagement activities 
(e.g., volunteering, job searching) could expect to get commercial insurance.78 
The court overruled the alternative Medicaid Act objectives used by the 
Secretary of DHHS to justify approving and re-approving Kentucky HEALTH, 
namely to promote health and financial independence or commercial insurance 
coverage, and to enhance fiscal sustainability. To begin with, the court found 
 
 72. Id. at 156. 
 73. Id. at 131, 136, 156. 
 74. Id. at 140; Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C 2018). Accord Pharm. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 664–65 (2003) (noting that providing cheaper drugs to 
individuals not enrolled in Medicaid and cutting Medicaid costs “would not provide a sufficient 
basis for upholding the [supplemental drug rebate] program if it severely curtailed recipients’ 
access to” Medicaid services). 
 75. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 133–34. See also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 261 (“The 
fundamental failure here . . . is that [the Secretary] ignored that objective in evaluating Kentucky 
HEALTH.”). 
 76. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140. See also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 263. 
 77. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 141. 
 78. Id. at 142. See also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 264. See generally Letter from Byry 
Kennedy, Gen. Counsel, N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Kay Drought, Litig. Dir., N.H. 
Legal Assistance (Aug. 22, 2019) (on file with author). 
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that the objective of promoting health was not an independent objective of the 
Medicaid Act.79 According to the court, “[t]reating health—rather than the 
furnishing of medical services—as the Act’s ultimate goal is nothing ‘more than 
a sleight of hand,’” because it impermissibly “extrapolate[s] the objectives of 
the statute to a higher level of generality.”80 While promoting health might be a 
desirable result of the Medicaid program, the court reasoned that the Secretary 
had no authority to “choose his own means to that end.”81 Rather, the text and 
the structure of the Medicaid Act show that Congress “designed a scheme to 
address not health generally but the provision of care to needy populations.”82 
As Judge Boasberg pointed out, the Secretary’s construct would allow him to 
approve any policy he subjectively concluded might improve health outcomes, 
no matter how far afield from Medicaid’s basic purpose of reimbursing the costs 
of medical care. He wrote: “Nothing could stop him from conditioning Medicaid 
coverage on consuming more broccoli . . . [o]r . . . forc[ing] all recipients to 
enroll in pilates classes or take certain nutritional supplements.”83 
Next, the court found that the Secretary’s goals of promoting individuals’ 
self-sufficiency and transitioning them from Medicaid to commercial coverage 
are also not independent objectives of the Medicaid Act.84 Even accepting the 
argument, the court found that the Secretary acted arbitrarily because he never 
balanced the trade-offs between this objective and the Medicaid Act’s core 
objective of furnishing health insurance coverage to needy people.85  
Thereafter, the court addressed the Secretary’s final justifications that the 
project would enhance cost savings and fiscal sustainability. In Stewart I, the 
government labeled cost savings a “happy side effect” of the project,86 but on 
re-approval, cost became the Secretary’s primary rationale for approving the 
project. The court agreed that cost can be considered when discerning whether 
or not a project passes muster under Section 1115.87 However, as the court noted, 
under the APA “[t]he Secretary must also give an adequate explanation for why 
Kentucky HEALTH advances that objective, and why, if it is adverse to other 
Medicaid objectives [i.e., furnishing medical assistance], he could reasonably 
 
 79. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 138. 
 80. Id. at 144 (quoting Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 266); id. 
 81. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 266–67 (quoting Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 535 
(D.C. Cir. 2017)) (“Agencies are . . . bound not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has 
selected, but by the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those 
purposes.”). 
 82. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 144. See also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 267. 
 83. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 267–68. 
 84. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145. See also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 271. 
 85. See Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 271–72. 
 86. Id. at 270 (quoting Transcript of Motion Hearing at 42–43, Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 
(D.D.C. 2018) (No. 18-152)). 
 87. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (reasoning that 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2017) aims to 
furnish medical assistance “as far as practicable under the conditions” in the state). 
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conclude that, on balance, it promotes the objectives of the Act as required by § 
1115.”88 The court found that the Secretary had not made a reasoned decision 
because he made no findings that Kentucky HEALTH would save Kentucky any 
money or otherwise make the Medicaid program more sustainable.89 Notably, 
this reasoning is in line with that used by previous courts, which have noted that 
if the “purpose of [a Section 1115] waiver application [i]s to save money,” the 
application does not satisfy Section 1115.90 Section 1115 “was not enacted to 
enable states to save money or to evade federal requirements but to test out new 
ideas.”91 
In addition, Judge Boasbeg refused to accept the idea advanced by the 
Secretary of DHHS that dramatic coverage losses for adults eligible through the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion could be justified by the need to preserve funding 
for “traditional” Medicaid populations.92 Instead, the court assessed the words 
and structure of the Medicaid Act and found that the Act does not prioritize some 
mandatory populations over others.93 
Finally, the court rejected the government’s argument that Kentucky 
HEALTH would promote coverage because, without it, the state might de-
expand Medicaid in response to fiscal strain. Judge Boasberg found this 
reasoning impermissible under the statute. He pointed out that the argument does 
not depend on fiscal sustainability at all; “[r]ather, all that matters is that a state, 
like Kentucky, has threatened to de-expand Medicaid if its proposed 
demonstration is not approved. The underlying reason for the threat—whether 
budgetary priorities, fiscal crisis, or their policy goals—is of no moment.”94 As 
a result, he found that the argument “is not subject to any kind of limiting 
principle.”95 It would allow a state to treat Medicaid “as an ‘a la carte exercise, 
picking and choosing which of Congress’s mandates it wanted to implement.”96 
Judge Boasberg reasoned that, taken to its logical conclusion, the Secretary’s 
argument would mean that when states threaten to de-expand, “or indeed do 
away with all of Medicaid—for fiscal reasons or no reason at all—if the 
Secretary does not approve whatever waiver of whatever Medicaid requirements 
 
 88. Id. at 149. See also id. at 152 (explaining that “a project that enhances financial 
sustainability may not advance the objectives of Medicaid if it significantly impedes or curtails 
Medicaid services or coverage.”). 
 89. Id. at 149. See also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 270–71. 
 90. Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 91. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 92. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 268–70. 
 93. Id. at 269. See also Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 153. 
 94. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 153. Judge Boasberg later pointed out that the New 
Hampshire approval proved this point because the State threatened to de-expand without a 
justification. Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *10 (D.D.C. July 
29, 2019). 
 95. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 154. 
 96. Id. at 153. 
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they wish to obtain,” the Secretary could approve those requests “no matter how 
few people remain on Medicaid thereafter because any waiver would be 
coverage promoting compared to a world in which the state offers no coverage 
at all” (emphasis in original).97 He concluded that Congress did not, and could 
not, grant the Secretary such unbridled authority.98 Rather, the text of Section 
1115 makes it clear that the baseline against which a proposed project must be 
evaluated is not “a hypothetical future universe” with no Medicaid coverage at 
all, but Medicaid coverage provided in compliance with the Medicaid Act.99 
2. The Arkansas Case: Gresham v. Azar100 
On March 5, 2018, the Secretary of DHHS approved Arkansas’s request to 
condition Medicaid coverage on work requirements (eighty hours per month) 
and to limit retroactive coverage.101 The work requirements went into effect on 
June 1, 2018.102 There were immediate repercussions. Nearly one in five 
enrollees subject to the work requirement lost coverage in the first two months 
after the penalties kicked in. More than 18,000 enrollees were terminated by the 
end of 2018.103 A study by Harvard researchers found “significant losses in 
health insurance coverage in the initial 6 months of the policy but no significant 
change in employment.”104 
Medicaid beneficiaries in Arkansas challenged the Secretary’s approval of 
the project on similar grounds as those raised in the Stewart cases.105 The 
Secretary’s approval letter was largely a repeat of the initial Kentucky HEALTH 
approval letter, leading the court to find, “It’s déjà vu all over again.”106 Thus, 
 
 97. Id. at 154. 
 98. Id. See also, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 538–39 
(1935) (finding delegation unconstitutional where President had authority to “impose his own 
conditions, adding to or taking from what is proposed, as ‘in his discretion’ he thinks necessary ‘to 
effectuate the policy’ declared by the act.”). 
 99. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (explaining that Section 1115 only authorizes the 
Secretary to waive compliance with certain Medicaid Act provisions “to the extent and for the 
period . . . necessary” to carry out the project). 
 100. See generally Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019), appeal filed, Nos. 19-
5094 & 19-5095. The plaintiffs are represented by the National Health Law Program, Legal Aid of 
Arkansas, Southern Poverty Law Center, and Jenner & Block LLP. 
 101. Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Cindy 
Gillespie, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Mar. 5, 2018) (available at https://www.medicaid.gov 
/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Robin Rudowitz et al., February State Data for Medicaid Work Requirements in Arkansas, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/state-data-for-medicaid-
work-requirements-in-arkansas/ (collecting Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. reports). 
 104. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid Work Requirements—Results from the First Year 
in Arkansas, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1073, 1079 (2019). 
 105. Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 168–69. Arkansas intervened as a defendant. Id. at 173. 
 106. Id. at 175. 
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in Gresham v. Azar, Judge Boasberg held the Secretary’s approval was arbitrary 
and capricious because it failed to address whether and how the project would 
impact Medicaid’s “core” objective of furnishing medical coverage to the 
needy.107 And once again, the court found that the Secretary could not ignore 
this core objective in favor of his other objectives—promoting health and 
financial independence.108  
Unlike Kentucky, Arkansas did not include in its application an assessment 
of the extent to which the project would affect Medicaid coverage.109 The court 
found this of little moment, stating:  
Whether a state gives the Secretary excellent data or no data at all about 
coverage, his duty remains the same: to determine whether the proposed project 
will promote the objectives of the Act, including whether it advances or hinders 
the provision of health coverage to the needy. If it were otherwise, HHS could 
approve a project that would decimate Medicaid coverage without so much as 
addressing the issue where the state did not submit its own estimate of coverage 
loss. Even putting to one side the agency’s affirmative obligation to address 
coverage loss, however, the Secretary unquestionably has a duty to consider that 
issue where multiple commenters provide credible forecasts that it will 
occur. . . . Here, as has been said, the agency had and neglected that duty.110 
3. The New Hampshire Case: Philbrick v. Azar111 
On November 30, 2018, the Secretary of DHHS approved New Hampshire’s 
project to impose work requirements (100 hours each month) and waive 
retroactive coverage on the grounds that the project would improve the “health 
and wellness” of beneficiaries and enhance the “fiscal sustainability of the 
Medicaid program.”112 New Hampshire Medicaid beneficiaries challenged the 
approval, citing similar claims as were raised in the Kentucky and Arkansas 
cases.113  
With a record in the New Hampshire case “indistinguishable” from the 
previous cases and an approval letter “mirror[ing] the one in Stewart II, with 
numerous key paragraphs matching it word for word,” the court again faulted 
the Agency for not contending with the possibility that the project would cause 
 
 107. Id. at 176, 181 (noting that the Secretary of DHHS referred to the provision of medical 
assistance as “Medicaid’s core objective”). 
 108. Id. at 179–80. Unlike in Kentucky, the fiscal sustainability objective did not figure 
prominently in the Arkansas approval. 
 109. Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 178. 
 110. Id. (citations to administrative record omitted). 
 111. See generally Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *1 (D.D.C. 
July 29, 2019). The plaintiffs are represented by the National Health Law Program, New 
Hampshire Legal Assistance, and National Center for Law and Economic Justice. 
 112. Id. at *3–4. 
 113. Id. at *5. 
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substantial losses in Medicaid coverage.114 Judge Boasberg found this omission 
“particularly startling” in light of information before the Secretary of DHHS 
about the dramatic coverage losses from Arkansas’s “markedly similar 
project.”115 The court was also aware that the state had postponed the date for 
beginning to terminate people from coverage (originally August 1, 2019), when 
data showed that approximately 17,000 beneficiaries (out of about 25,000 total) 
were at risk of losing coverage.116 Stating that “we have all seen this movie 
before,” Judge Boasberg concluded, for the fourth time, that DHHS failed to 
engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” as required by the APA because the 
Secretary did not adequately consider the impact of the proposed project on 
Medicaid coverage.117  
As in Stewart II, the Agency’s main argument was that the Secretary 
reasonably concluded that the project would allow New Hampshire to stretch 
limited Medicaid resources. The court concluded, as it did in Stewart II, that 
DHHS’s explanation did not “clear the bar.”118 To begin with, DHHS made no 
finding that the project would save the state “any amount of money or otherwise 
make the program more sustainable in some way.”119 Meanwhile, New 
Hampshire said it did not intend or expect the project to reduce costs, thus 
causing the court to observe, “The glaring disconnect between the Secretary’s 
position and New Hampshire’s raises substantial questions about how the 
agency came to believe the program would improve the State’s fiscal 
circumstances, underscoring the need for reasoned analysis of this issue.”120 
Second, the court found that evidence in the record raised “substantial reasons 
to doubt” whether the project would save any money given administrative costs 
and the possible rise in uncompensated care that would accrue to the state.121 
Also problematic, the Secretary never explained why he found the project might 
transition beneficiaries to commercial coverage, “given the consistent evidence 
before him that nearly all Medicaid recipients are already working, unable to 
work, or able to find only low-paying jobs that do not offer or lead to commercial 
[insurance] coverage.”122 
 
 114. Id. at *7. 
 115. See id. at *1. 
 116. Philbrick, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *4. 
 117. See id. at *2 (quoting Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011)). See also Michigan v. 
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015). 
 118. Philbrick, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *12. 
 119. Id. (quoting Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 149 (D.D.C. 2019)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at *13 (citing administrative record and also pointing out that the Medicaid expansion 
is almost entirely federally funded). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2018) (establishing federal 
payments at between 90 and 100 percent of the costs). 
 122. Philbrick, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *13. 
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Finally, the court rejected DHHS’s suggestion that the project advanced the 
objectives of Medicaid regardless of its effect on health and coverage because it 
would help the state and federal governments collect useful data for future policy 
making purposes.123 Observing that “no one is suggesting with a straight face 
that a purpose of the Medicaid Act is to collect data,” the court also found the 
practical consequences of the government’s suggestion to be alarming. “If 
experimentation alone could justify a project, then demonstrations with dire 
consequences for Medicaid beneficiaries could be approved just for the 
Government to gather information.”124  
B. Pivotal Questions Regarding Judicial Review of the Secretary’s Section 
1115 Authority 
1. Does the Secretary have plenary, unreviewable authority to decide 
whether to approve a Section 1115 waiver? 
When sued, the Secretary of DHHS has argued that courts cannot review the 
Agency’s decision because, under the APA, it is committed by law to the 
Agency’s discretion.125 The Secretary points out that Section 1115 authorizes 
approval of projects “in the judgment of the Secretary.”126 
This argument most likely fails because there is a “strong presumption that 
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.”127 The Supreme 
Court’s 2019 decision in Department of Commerce v. New York, illustrates this 
point.128 There, the Court rejected the government’s argument that the 
Commerce Secretary’s decision to include a citizenship question on the 2020 
census was unreviewable.129 The Supreme Court reiterated that it reads the 
APA’s exception for action committed to agency discretion “quite narrowly.”130 
Reviewing provisions of the Census Act, the Court concluded that the Act did 
not reflect one of those “rare circumstances” where a court “would have no 
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of 
discretion.”131  
 
 123. Id. at *14. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2018). 
 127. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). See also Abbott 
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (explaining that the APA “embodies the basic 
presumption of judicial review” of agency action). 
 128. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019). 
 129. Id. at 2568. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (noting that Census Act did not leave the Secretary with unbounded authority because, 
among other things, it “instructs [the Secretary] to take ‘a decennial census of population’ in ‘such 
form and content as he may determine’” and authorizes him or her to “obtain such other census 
information as necessary.”). 
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Indeed, all federal courts that have faced the question to date have found that 
the Secretary’s decision to grant a Section 1115 waiver is judicially 
reviewable.132 In Beno v. Shalala, for example, the Ninth Circuit pointed out 
that Congress has established “an all encompassing series of statutory 
requirements” in the Medicaid Act, and “the granting of an exemption from 
statutory requirements is not an area of agency discretion traditionally 
unreviewable.”133 That court found that in granting waiver authority, Section 
1115 “provides a meaningful standard by which to judge the Secretary’s 
waiver,” allowing waivers only for the extent and time period necessary to 
implement an experimental project that is likely to promote the objectives of the 
Act.134 Putting it another way, the court stated that “the mere fact that a statute 
contains discretionary language does not make agency action unreviewable.”135 
The Ninth Circuit concluded by stating: “[W]e doubt that Congress would enact 
such comprehensive regulations, frame them in mandatory language, require the 
Secretary to enforce them, and then enact a statute allowing states to evade these 
requirements with little or no federal agency review.”136  
2. Assuming the Secretary does not have plenary authority, what level of 
deference, if any, should courts give the Secretary’s Section 1115 
approval decision?  
This brings us to Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., which lower courts have used for over thirty-five years to decide deference 
questions.137 Under Chevron, if the underlying statute is clear, then that is the 
end of the matter and an agency’s interpretation of the statute gets no deference. 
However, if there is an ambiguity in the statute, then the court should defer to 
the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute provided that the agency is 
authorized by Congress to interpret the statute.138 Members of the Supreme 
Court have questioned the ongoing application of Chevron.139  
 
 132. See, e.g., Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 378, 380 (9th Cir. 2011); Beno v. 
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 1994); C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 
171, 183 (3d Cir. 1996); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1105 (2d Cir. 1973); Stewart I, 313 
F. Supp. 3d 237, 256 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 133. See Beno, 30 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 
1993)). Beno also noted that “federalism arguments have less weight in the context of a waiver of 
a congressional requirement.” Id. at 1068. 
 134. Id. at 1067. 
 135. Id. at 1066. 
 136. Id. at 1068–69 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 137. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 138. Id. at 842–43. 
 139. See, e.g., SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (noting the “impressive 
body” of pre-Chevron law recognizing that “the meaning of a statutory term is properly a matter 
for judicial [rather than] administrative judgement.”); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 
1630 (2018) (finding, even under Chevron, no deference was due to the agency because the Court 
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Even with that standard in place, the plaintiffs in the pending Medicaid 
Section 1115 waiver cases have argued that the Chevron framework does not 
apply. They note that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that deference is 
not appropriate when an agency decision touches on issues “of deep ‘economic 
and political significance’ that [are] central to [a] statutory scheme.”140 That is 
especially true when the “agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an 
unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy” 
and asserts that power in a way that would “bring about an enormous and 
transformative expansion” in the agency’s authority “without clear 
congressional authorization.”141 The plaintiffs have argued that is precisely what 
is occurring with the administration’s expressly stated intent to use Section 1115 
work requirement waivers to explode the ACA and its Medicaid expansion.142  
Not surprisingly, the Secretary of DHHS does not agree. Rather, he has 
argued that, even if he lacks plenary authority over Section 1115, courts must 
afford his decisions “utmost deference” because they involve “predictive 
judgments” about areas that are within his “policy and scientific expertise.”143 
This argument probably goes too far because courts recognize that “new agency 
policies often will involve some element of prediction about the future effects 
of those policies,” but this does not cause them to “treat the predictive nature of 
the judgment as though it were a talisman under which any agency decision is 
by definition unimpeachable.”144 To do otherwise would leave “the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of judicial review . . . effectively nullified.”145 In short, a 
“[p]redictive judgment must be based on reasoned predictions,” as supported by 
the administrative record in the case.146 
 
was “more than up to the job” of solving the interpretive puzzle); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 
2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (cautioning lower courts against “reflexive 
deference” to agency interpretation, particularly where that interpretation concerns the agency’s 
own authority, and finding it “necessary and appropriate” to reconsider Chevron and how courts 
have implemented it); Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing Chevron as an “important, 
frequently invoked, once celebrated, and now increasingly maligned precedent.”). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 
706 (2018) (Provision of the APA requiring courts to “decide all relevant questions of law.”). 
 140. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). 
 141. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
 142. See Stewart III, 308 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (D.D.C. 2018). See also First Amended Class 
Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 19–20, Stewart III, 308 F. Supp. 3d 239 
(No. 18-152). 
 143. Memorandum in Support of Fed. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, 
for Summary Judgment & in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, 
12, Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675 (D.D.C. June 6, 2019). 
 144. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821–23 (D.D.C. 1983) 
(vacating agency action where the agency did not give “sufficient consideration to factors that may 
be highly relevant to” its predictive judgment). 
 145. Id. at 822. 
 146. Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 237 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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Notably, in his decisions, Judge Boasberg has side-stepped the plaintiffs’ 
argument of no deference and has not applied the Secretary’s “utmost deference” 
standard. Applying the traditional Chevron standard, the court concluded that 
DHHS’s interpretation of Medicaid’s objectives fell “outside the bounds of 
reasonableness.”147 As discussed above, the court reasoned that an interpretation 
of Medicaid’s objectives that “do not include ‘furnish[ing] . . . medical 
assistance’ to the expansion group . . . would be ‘utterly unreasonable’ in light 
of Medicaid’s text, structure, and legislative history.”148 Of course, the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals will have to grapple with these questions 
of reviewability and deference as it decides whether to affirm or reject Judge 
Boasberg’s reasoning. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Congress included Section 1115 in the Social Security Act to allow the state 
and federal governments to improve the techniques of administering public 
assistance.149 While broadly written to encourage innovation, Section 1115 
contains notable limitations on the Secretary of DHHS’s authority. The 
Secretary may only approve an experimental, pilot or demonstration project that 
is likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act.150 When those features 
are present, the Secretary can only waive certain Medicaid Act provisions and 
only to the extent and for the period necessary for the state to carry out the 
experiment.151  
The Trump administration is making unprecedented use of Section 1115 as 
part of its campaign to “explode” the ACA, including its Medicaid expansion, 
and to rollback Medicaid coverage.152 The Secretary has approved Section 1115 
waiver applications that contain work requirements and other restrictions that 
will cause tens of thousands of Medicaid enrollees—the vast majority of whom 
are working or unable to work—to be jettisoned from coverage.153 So far, these 
efforts have been blocked in court. Applying the Chevron standard of review, a 
federal district court has found the Secretary has violated the APA by taking 
arbitrary and capricious actions and, as a result, vacated the approvals. In these 
 
 147. See Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted); Stewart II, 366 
F. Supp. 3d 125, 144 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation omitted); Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 176 
(D.D.C. 2019) (finding deference of little practical significance because the Secretary agreed with 
the court’s understanding that furnishing health coverage is a “core objective” of the Medicaid Act); 
Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2019) 
(citation omitted). 
 148. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 270. 
 149. S. REP. NO. 87-1589, at 31 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1973. 
 150. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)(1) (2017). 
 151. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 152. Goldstein & Eilperin, supra note 35. 
 153. E.g., Rudowitz et al., supra note 103, at 1. 
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cases involving cookie-cutter waiver approvals for Kentucky, Arkansas, and 
New Hampshire, the court has concluded that the Secretary acted unreasonably 
because his justifications for approval (e.g., transitioning individuals off 
Medicaid and saving money) have ignored the Medicaid Act’s core, essential 
objective of furnishing affordable health coverage to low-income people who 
cannot afford it.154 The district court’s reasoning will be scrutinized by the court 
of appeals and perhaps even the Supreme Court. Stay tuned.  
  
 
 154. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
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